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We develop a theory of interstate conflict in which the degree of genealogical relatedness 
between populations has a positive effect on their conflict propensities because more closely 
related populations, on average, tend to interact more and develop more disputes over sets of 
common issues. We examine the empirical relationship between the occurrence of interstate 
conflicts and the degree of relatedness between countries, showing that populations that are 
genetically closer are more prone to go to war with each other, even after controlling for a 
wide set of measures of geographic distance and other factors that affect conflict, including 
measures of trade and democracy. 
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Militarized conﬂicts have been among the most dramatic and costly events in human history, and
at the center of an enormous historical and political literature for centuries.1 In recent years, econo-
mists and political scientists have started to use formal theoretical tools and systematic empirical
analyses to provide insights into the determinants of conﬂicts and wars.2 Great progress has been
made in our understanding of the eﬀects of economic and political factors - such as trade and
democracy - on the likelihood of international conﬂict.3 Nonetheless, wars continue to be elusive
phenomena, and fundamental questions about their roots remain open. A key question, which has
not yet received a satisfactory empirical answer, is whether armed conﬂicts are more or less likely to
emerge between populations that diﬀer along cultural and historical dimensions, such as ethnicity,
language, and religion.
In this paper we present a new theoretical approach, new data and new empirical ﬁndings
shedding light on the determinants of international conﬂict. We use information about human
genetic distance - a summary statistic of very long-run historical and cultural relatedness between
populations - to explore the relationship between kinship and conﬂict.4 Genetic distance measures
1For recent salient examples, see Blainey (1988), Keegan (1984), Ferguson (2006) and Nye (2008).
2Classic contributions are Schelling (1960) and Boulding (1962). More recent economic formalizations of conﬂict
and wars include, for example, Garﬁnkel (1990), Hirshleifer (1991, 1995), Skaperdas (1992), Hess and Orphanides
(1995, 2001), Jackson and Morelli (2009). Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas (2006) provide an overview of the economics
literature on conﬂict. Inﬂuential contributions by political scientists on the formal theory of conﬂict include Bueno de
Mesquita and Lalman (1992), Fearon (1995) and Powell (1999). Systematic empirical work on interstate conﬂict was
pioneerd by Wright (1942), Richardson (1960) and Singer (1972). For discussions of the recent empirical literature
on the correlates of war see Vasquez (2000) and Schneider, Barbieri and Gleditsch (2003).
3The liberal peace view that trade and democracy should reduce the risk of war goes back to Montesquieu (1748)
and Kant (1795), and has been the subject of a vast literature (e.g., see Oneal and Russett, 1999a and Russett
and Oneal, 2001). Contributions on the empirics of trade and conﬂict include Polacheck (1980), Oneal and Russett
(1999b), Barbieri (2002), and Martin, Mayer and Thoenig (2008), among many others. On the democratic peace
hypothesis see, for example, Maoz and Russett (1993), Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999), Gowa (2000), and Levy and
Razin (2004).
4Speciﬁcally, we use measures of FST distance between human populations from Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994).
The measure FST was ﬁrst suggested by the great geneticist and statistician Sewall Wright (1950). Interestingly,
Sewall was the older brother of Quincy Wright, the professor of international law who pioneered empirical research
on conﬂict (Wright, 1942). According to Singer (2000): "The story has it that [Sewall] admired Quincy’s scholarship
and his preoccupation with the scourge of war but lamented the lack of methodological rigor in his work and thus
1the diﬀerence in gene distributions between two populations, where the genes under considerations
are neutral: they change randomly and independently of selection pressure, and thus do not aﬀect
traits that directly matter for survival and ﬁtness. Most random genetic change takes place regularly
over time, as in a molecular clock (Kimura, 1968). Consequently, genetic distance measures the time
since two populations have shared common ancestors - i.e., since they were the same population.
In other words, divergence in neutral genes provides information about lines of descent: genetic
distance is a summary measure of general relatedness between populations. Heuristically, the
concept is analogous to relatedness between individuals: two siblings are more closely related
than two cousins because they share more recent common ancestors - their parents rather than
their grandparents. Since a very large number of characteristics - including cultural traits - are
transmitted across generations over the long run, genetic distance provides a comprehensive measure
of long-term cultural and historical distance across populations.
This paper’s main result is that, surprisingly, genetic distance reduces the risk of conﬂict.
Populations that are more closely related are more likely to engage in interstate conﬂict and wars,
even after controlling for a wide range of geographic measures, measures of linguistic and religious
distance, and other factors that aﬀect interstate conﬂict including trade and democracy. These
ﬁndings are consistent with a simple theoretical framework in which the degree of genealogical
relatedness between populations has a positive eﬀect on their conﬂict propensities, because closely
related populations, on average, tend to share common traits and preferences, to interact with
each other more, and to care about a larger set of common issues. In principle, such a conﬂict-
generating eﬀect could be oﬀset by countervailing forces. More closely related populations could
also have closer ideal points or could be better at coordinating on peaceful equilibria. However,
in the data these other forces, if they exist, do not seem to be strong enough to counteract the
main eﬀect stemming from the greater set of common issues arising among genetically related
populations. In a nutshell, from a long-term world-wide perspective, issues of war and peace are
(unhappy) family matters.5
introduced him to the scientiﬁc method - hence the ﬁfteen-year project that culminated in the monumental Study of
War (1942)." We hope that the Wright brothers would appreciate our joining their two lines of research in a study
titled "War and Relatedness." The Wrights were a truly remarkable family. As explained in Stock and Trebbi (2003),
Sewall and Quincy’s father Philip Wright was the inventor of instrumental variable regression (and Sewall might have
contributed to that discovery as well).
5We apologize to Leo Tolstoy for the double plagiarism.
2This paper builds on a large and diverse literature. Broad questions about cultural distance, re-
latedness and conﬂict are probably as old as wars themselves, but have received increasing attention
following the recent debate over the clash of civilizations (Huntington, 1993) and surging concerns
about ethnic conﬂict within and across countries. For instance, Maynes (1993, p. 5) writes: "Ani-
mosity among ethnic groups is beginning to rival the spread of nuclear weapons as the most serious
threat to peace that the world faces". Several commentators have wondered whether there may
be a general tendency towards violent confrontation between populations that are culturally and
ethnically distant. For example, Bremer (2000, p. 27), referring to evidence from social psychology,
wonders whether "cultural diﬀerences [...] should lead to misunderstandings, stereotyping, clashes
of values, and so forth, which in turn promote intercultural ﬁghts". This debate can partly be
traced back to the sociologist William G. Sumner (1906), who formulated the primordialist view
that ethnic dissimilarity between groups should be associated with war and plunder, while soci-
eties that are culturally related would tend to ﬁght less with each other. In contrast, others have
emphasized instrumentalist views of ethnicity, implying that such diﬀerences should not be closely
correlated with inter-group conﬂict (e.g., Merton, 1957). A related hypothesis, proposed but not
tested by Gleditsch and Singer (1975), is that the paramount force in conﬂict is geographical con-
tiguity, and that, controlling for contiguity, one would not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant correlation between
cultural relatedness and interstate conﬂict (see Henderson, 1997, for a review of this debate). At
the same time, the few scholars who have attempted to estimate the eﬀects of common culture,
language or religion on international conﬂict have found little or no evidence that such variables are
systematically associated with a lower probability of conﬂict.6 In their inﬂuential study on conﬂict
within states, Fearon and Laitin (2003) also found no evidence that ethnically diverse states would
be more likely to experience civil conﬂict.
Our results go further in casting doubts over primordialist theories, as we show not only that
their predictions are falsiﬁed when applied to interstate conﬂict, but that the eﬀect goes into the
opposite direction. The negative eﬀect of genetic distance holds when controlling for a vast range
of geographic measures (contiguity, geodesic distance, latitudinal and longitudinal diﬀerences, and
other measures of geographic barriers), contrary to Gleditsch and Singer’s (1975) hypothesis that
6For example, see Richardson (1960, p. 296), who found no general pacifying eﬀect for either common language or
common religion, and Henderson (1997), who, controlling only for contiguity, found a negative association between a
measure of religious similarity and interstate conﬂict, and a positive (but insigniﬁcant) correlation between a measure
of ethnic similarity and conﬂict. See also the more recent contribution of Gartzke and Gleditsch (2006).
3geographic proximity should be the predominant force in international conﬂict. It seems that
the paramount eﬀect attributed by some scholars to geographic proximity may in part be due
to its correlation with cultural and historical relatedness. Once genetic distance is taken into
account, geographic variables have smaller eﬀects (although they remain signiﬁcant). The eﬀect
of genetic distance is even higher - and the eﬀects of geography smaller - when we instrument for
modern genetic distance using genetic distance between ancestor populations of current countries
as of 1500, to account for measurement error and possible endogeneity issues due to post-1500
migrations. The eﬀect of genetic distance is also robust when accounting for other measures of
cultural similarity, such as religious and linguistic distance, and for diﬀerences in income per capita
across countries. Interestingly, religious distance also reduces the likelihood of conﬂict. This would
be hard to rationalize within a clash-of-civilizations view, but is consistent with the predictions of
our common-issues model.
Interesting results also emerge when adding measures of trade and democracy, to capture the
central predictions of liberal peace theory: extensive bilateral trade links and the extent of democ-
racy among countries in a pair should reduce their propensity to go to war. Not only are the eﬀect
of relatedness robust to controlling for trade and democracy variables, but the eﬀects of trade
and democracy on conﬂi c th o l de v e na f t e rc o n t r o l l i n gf o rr e latedness. We are therefore able to
address one of the most important criticisms of the empirical work on this subject: observers who
believe that culturally related countries ﬁght less with each other have often questioned whether
there is a direct causal link going from trade and democracy to lower conﬂict, on the ground that
culturally more similar societies also tend to trade more with each other and to share more similar
political arrangements (such as democratic regimes). Following this reasoning, the observed low
level of conﬂi c tm i g h tn o tb et h ed i r e c te ﬀect of trade and democracy, but rather the outcome
of deeper cultural similarities (for discussions of this debate see, for example, Schneider, Barbieri
and Gleditsch, 2003). In contrast, our estimates provide strong evidence that the premise that
closely related populations ﬁght less with each other is incorrect, and hence cannot account for the
pacifying eﬀects of bilateral trade and democracy. In sum, our ﬁndings validate the liberal view
concerning the pacifying eﬀects of trade and democracy.
This paper is the ﬁrst, to our knowledge, to study the relationship between genetic distance
and the likelihood of international conﬂict and wars.7 It is part of a small but growing empirical
7In general, there are few formal or empirical analyses of the relations between war and genetic variables. Con-
4literature on the connections between long-term relatedness and societal outcomes. In particular,
while human genetic distance is not commonly used in the social sciences, recent work has pointed
out to its usefulness and predictive power in economics and related areas. Spolaore and Wacziarg
(2009) document the relation between genetic distance and diﬀerences in income per capita across
countries, and provide an economic interpretation in terms of diﬀusion of economic development
from the world technological frontier. Desmet et al. (2007) ﬁnd a close relationship between
genetic distance and cultural diﬀerences measured by the World Values Survey, which supports
our interpretation of genetic distance as a broad measure of diﬀerences in intergenerationally-
transmitted traits, including cultural characteristics.8 More broadly, our paper is related to the
evolutionary literature on cultural transmission of traits and preferences (e.g., Cavalli-Sforza and
Feldman, 1981; Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Richerson and Boyd, 2004; for economic analyses of
cultural transmission, see for instance Bisin and Verdier, 2000, 2001).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a stylized model of conﬂict
and relatedness (an extension is included in Appendix 1). Section 3 introduces our data and
methodology. Section 4 discusses the empirical ﬁndings. Section 5 concludes.
2A M o d e l o f C o n ﬂict and Relatedness
War is a very complex and multi-faceted phenomenon, and the relationship between conﬂict and
long-term relatedness is also likely to be quite complex. That’s exactly why it is useful to address
this topic with the simplest possible framework we can design, keeping in mind that the main
goal of our theoretical exercise is not to provide a complete and realistic description of actual
interstate wars, but to obtain clear, testable implications that can shed light on the facts we
will document in our empirical section. Therefore, in this section we present a stylized model
tributions by economists are Hirshleifer (1998), who provided a theoretical discussion of the evolutionary motives for
warfare, including the "aﬃliative instinct" (partially related to the primordialist view), and, more recently, Bowles
(2009), who studies whether warfare among ancestral hunters-gathers may have aﬀected the evolution of group-
beneﬁcial behavior.
8Desmet et al. (2007) ﬁnd that European populations that are genetically closer give more similar answers to
ab r o a ds e to f430 questions about norms, values and cultural characteristics, included in the 2005 World Values
Suvey sections on perceptions of life, family, religion and morals. They also ﬁnd that the correlation between
genetic distance and diﬀerences in cultural values remains positive and signiﬁcant after controlling for linguistic and
geographic distances.
5of conﬂict, which captures the interrelations among international disputes, probability of violent
conﬂict and relatedness in a crude but direct way, abstracting from unnecessary complications
while highlighting the simple logic of the main mechanisms. In 2.1 we specify states’ preferences
over sets of issues, and deﬁne the concepts of common issues and disputes between states. In 2.2
we model states’ choices over war and peace, and derive the equilibrium conditions under which
disputes are resolved peacefully or violently. In 2.3 we link current preferences over issues to
intergenerational transmissions of characteristics, and derive the relation between probability of
conﬂict and relatedness.
2.1 Preferences and Common Issues
Consider two sovereign states (1 and 2), facing a set of issues M.9 Each issue k ∈ M can take





i(k)|dk − ci (1)
where x(k) is the actual outcome for issue k, x∗
i(k) is state i’s most preferred outcome, αi(k) ≥ 0 is
the weight that state i attributes to issue k,a n dci denotes net costs from conﬂict (which are zero
if disputes are solved peacefully, positive otherwise). We introduce the following straightforward
deﬁnitions:
Deﬁnition 1
Issue k is a common issue between the two states if both states care about issue k -t h a ti s ,i f
a n do n l yi fα1(k) > 0 and α2(k) > 0.
Deﬁnition 2
A common issue k is disputed when the two states prefer diﬀerent outcomes x∗
1(k) 6= x∗
2(k),
where ∆(k) ≡ |x∗
1(k) − x∗
2(k)| denotes the diﬀerence between ideal outcomes. We say that the two
states face a dispute when one or more common issues are disputed.
2.2 The Resolution of Disputes
Disputes between the two states are resolved either peacefully or violently. When a dispute is
resolved peacefully, either state bears conﬂict costs (ci =0 , i =1 ,2), and the outcome for each
9For simplicity we treat a state - or, equivalently, its government - as a unitary agent.




where β denotes state 1’s bargaining power in a peaceful dispute, with 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. In contrast, if a
violent conﬂict occurs the winner sets all disputed issues according to its preferences. Let P denote
the probability that state 1 w i l lw i ni nav i o l e n tc o n ﬂict and set x(k)=x∗
1(k) for all k ∈ M,w h i l e
with probability 1 − P state 2 will win and set x(k)=x∗
2(k).10 Therefore, the expected outcome




Each state can choose whether to "start a conﬂict" (strategy C)o r" n o tt os t a r tac o n ﬂict" (strategy
NC). Peace results if and only if both states choose NC, in which case all issues are settled

















α2(k)π∆(k)dk − ψ2 (7)
If state 1 chooses C while state 2 chooses NC,w ea s s u m eP = π + σ1 with 0 <σ 1 ≤ (1− π). σ1
captures the increased probability of winning that results from a ﬁrst-mover’s advantage, in the
tradition of Schelling (1960). The costs of conﬂict are c1 = φ1 ≥ 0 and c2 = φ0









α2(k)(π + σ1)∆(k)dk − φ
0
2 (9)
10Since utility functions are linear, we will not distinguish between ex-ante (expected) outcomes and ex-post (actual)
outcomes in our notation, and denote both with x(k).
11This assumption means, quite reasonably, that when state 2 enters into a conﬂict "unwillingly," it will face conﬂict
costs at least as high as if it had decided to start the conﬂict willingly (i.e., if it had selected C rather than NC).
7Analogous equations hold for U1(NC,C) and U2(NC,C).12
If one state plays C, the other state is better oﬀ to play C rather than NC,g i v e nt h a tσi > 0
and φ0
i ≥ ψi, which implies:
Remark 1
(C,C) is a Nash equilibrium for all values of the parameters.
However, (C,C) may or may not be the unique Nash equilibrium. If (C,C) is the unique Nash
equilibrium, war occurs with certainty. If (NC,NC) is also a Nash equilibrium, war may be avoided
if both states coordinate on such peaceful equilibrium. Therefore, our model is consistent with
Fearon’s (1995) discussion of war as emerging from an inability to commit to a Pareto-superior
outcome. In our framework both states would be better oﬀ if each could commit to play NC,
but they can do that credibly only if (NC,NC) is also a Nash equilibrium. By substituting
U1(NC,NC) ≥ U1(C,NC) and U2(NC,NC) ≥ U2(NC,C) with the respective expressions above,
we have:
Remark 2
The peaceful outcome (NC,NC) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if:
(π − β + σ1)
Z
k∈M
α1(k)∆(k)dk ≤ φ1 (10)
(β − π + σ2)
Z
k∈M
α2(k)∆(k)dk ≤ φ2 (11)
These conditions can be simpliﬁed by assuming:
(i) symmetry (σ1 = σ2 and φ1 = φ2).
(ii) peaceful bargaining "under the shadow of war," (that is, a state’s bargaining power depends
on its strength should negotiations break up), which implies β = π.13
To simplify notation, deﬁne
φ
σ
≡ ω. The parameter ω captures the relative cost of starting a
war, increasing in the cost of going to war (φ) and decreasing in the temptation to start a war (σ).
Under (i) and (ii) the results in Remark 2 can be re-written as:
Remark 3
12When state 1 chooses NC and state 2 chooses C, P = π−σ2,w i t h0 <σ 2 ≤ π, c1 = φ
0
1 and c2 = φ2,a n dp a y o ﬀs
are U1(NC,C)=−
U




k∈M α2k(π − σ2)∆(k)dk − φ2
13This is a common assumption in the literature. For example, see Alesina and Spolaore (2005).






αi(k)∆(k)dk − ω} ≤ 0 (12)
In contrast, if maxi{
R
k∈M αi(k)∆(k)dk − ω} > 0,c o n ﬂict (C,C) is the unique Nash equilibrium.
Therefore, for a given relative cost of starting a war (measured by ω), violent conﬂict is more
likely to be the unique Nash equilibrium the larger are the set of common issues under dispute, and
the extent the two states care about those issues. But what is the probability of observing actual
conﬂict between states, and how does it depend on long-term relatedness? We will address these
questions in the rest of this section.
2.3 Relatedness and the Probability of Conﬂict
So far we have taken the set of common issues under dispute as given. Now we will consider the
relationship between common issues and long-term connections between populations. The general
idea is that if preferences over issues are persistent across time, and current populations inherit
such preferences with variation from their ancestors, on average populations that are more closely
related will be more likely to share a larger range of common issues.
A ﬁr s ts t e pi st oa s s u m et h a te a c hs t a t ec a r e sa b o u tam a s sR of issues denoted by a compact
set of points on the real line: speciﬁcally, state i cares about all issues between point ai and point
bi >a i,w i t hbi − ai = R, but does not care about issues outside that range. In addition, assume
that all relevant issues receive equal weight α>0 -t h a ti s ,αi(k)=α>0 i fa n do n l yi fai ≤ k ≤ bi,
while αi(k)=0otherwise. These assumptions allow to characterize the set of issues that state i
cares about by a single real number vi (to ﬁx ideas, the mid-point in state i’s set of relevant issues),
which we can interpret as that state’s type or fundamental characteristics:














i(k)|dk − ci (14)
14In this simpliﬁed analysis we assume that each state is a uniﬁed agent, formed by one population with homoge-
neous characteristics vj. In principle, two states can be of the same type - that is, they may care about the identical
set of issues. So we abstract from the possibility that states may include mixed populations with diﬀerent preferences
over issues (however, population heterogeneity within states will be taken into account in the empirical analysis).
9Let V (i,j) ≡ |vi −vj| denote the distance between state i and state j in their fundamental charac-
teristics.15 We are now ready to consider conﬂicts between states over such common issues.
2.3.1 Basic Setting
In what follows we derive the probability of conﬂict under two simplifying assumptions (we present
an extension relaxing Assumption 1 at the end of this section, while Assumption 2 is relaxed in
Appendix 1):
Assumption 1
The extent of disagreement over all issues is constant and normalized to one - that is, ∆(k)=1
for all k.
Assumption 2
When (NC,NC) is a Nash equilibrium, the two states will always coordinate on the peaceful
equilibrium (no coordination failure).16
An economic interpretation of Assumption 1 is in terms of conﬂict over rival issues. A good is
rival when (a) any increase in a state’s use of that good reduces the extent of the other state’s use,
and (b) each state’s preferred outcome is to have full and exclusive use of the good. In such context,
outcome x(k) can be conveniently deﬁned as the extent to which state 1 can use the good once the
dispute has been resolved, so that x∗
1(k)=1denotes state 1’s ideal outcome (state 1 has full and
exclusive use), and x∗
2(k)=0denotes state 2’s ideal outcome (state 2 has full and exclusive use).
Henceforth, ∆(k)=1for all rival issues. For instance, rival issues may arise when both states value
the same rival good (say, a religious/cultural center or an oﬀshore natural resource) because they
have similar preferences over consumption and/or share similar production technologies. Rivalry
may also emerge when the two states interact extensively with each other over an international
15Our theoretical framework abstracts from explicit geographical considerations: we study the eﬀects of relatedness
on conﬂict taking geographical factors as given, i.e. when considering the comparative statics of genetic distance on
conﬂict, we are implicitly looking at states that are at a constant geographic distance from each other. However,
empirically, geography and genetic distance are connected, and both have eﬀects on the probability of conﬂict.
We explicitly address these points in the empirical section by controlling for a vast range of geographical distance
measures.
16This assumption is equivalent to limiting the analysis to Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria, as deﬁned in Bernheim,
Peleg and Whinston (1987). .
10policy issue (e.g., labor ﬂows), and each state wants to impose its exclusive control over that issue.
States may also interact with each other over non-rival issues. For example, both states may care
about a common set of international public goods (security against terrorist threats, regulation of
pollution or other externalities), where the use by one state would not reduce the other’s ability to
use the same public good, but may disagree about the ideal features of the public good, captured
by x(k) in our simpliﬁed setting. Such more general case where ∆(k) may diﬀer from 1 is analyzed
at the end of this section, while right now we focus on the simpler case ∆(k)=1 .
How does the probability of violent conﬂict depend on the distance in fundamental character-
istics V (i,j)? First of all, conﬂict will never occur if V (i,j) >R . This captures the obvious but
important point that two states which are very distant in the set of issues they care about will have
no reason to ﬁght. In contrast, if V (i,j) <Rthey will share a range of common issues, and we
have the following:
Remark 4
Violent conﬂict (C, C) is the unique equilibrium if and only if:17
α[R − V (i,j)] >ω (15)
This simple inequality illustrates a key result: for a given range R of common issues, populations
which are more distant in preferences over relevant issues are less likely to go to war with each
other. In particular, if ω is a random variable distributed uniformly between 0 and ω,w eh a v e18
Proposition 1




[R − V (i,j)] (16)



















18Without loss of generality, we assume values of the parameters such that
α
ω
[R − V (i,j)] ≤ 1.
19That is, conﬂict is increasing in the extent states care about speciﬁc common issues (α) and the range of common
issues each state cares about (R), decreasing in the relative costs to start a conﬂict (ω), and decreasing in the distance
between the two states’ fundamental characteristics V (i,j).
11We now go a step further and derive the relation between probability of conﬂict and explicit mea-
sures of long-term relatedness (genetic distance). If preferences are transmitted intergenerationally
across populations (biologically and/or culturally) with variation, populations that are more closely
related will be more likely to care about the same issues. This can be illustrated with a simple
model of vertical transmission of characteristics. Assume that in period t a population i inherits its
type vit from an ancestor population with type vit−1, w i t hv a r i a t i o nc a p t u r e db yar a n d o ms h o c k
εit:
vit = vit−1 + εit (17)
Without loss of generality, consider only two periods, and assume that εit follow a simple ran-
dom walk, taking value ε>0 with probability 1/2 and −ε with probability 1/2 (with shocks
independently distributed across diﬀerent populations). Let g(i,j) ("genetic distance") denote the
number of periods since two populations have shared common ancestors (in the empirical analysis,
we use FST genetic distance, a measure that is approximately linear in the time since two pop-
ulations shared their last common ancestors). Populations at g(i,j)=1will be at V (i,j)=0
with probability 1/2 and V (i,j)=2 ε with probability 1/2, and hence at expected distance
E{V (i,j) | g(i,j)=1 } = ε. By contrast, two populations at g(i,j)=2(that is, sharing a










ε.H e n c e :
Remark 5
Expected distance in inherited characteristics V (i,j) is increasing in genetic distance g(i,j):




An immediate implication of Proposition 1 and Remark 5 is that genetic distance g(i,j) is inversely
related to their expected probability of conﬂict:20
Corollary 1
The expected probability of conﬂict between state i and state j is decreasing in genetic distance
g(i,j):




20The equation in Corollary 1 is derived under the assumption that the parameters are such that V (i,j) <Rfor
all possible realizations of the shocks. The eﬀect of genetic distance g(i,j) on the probability of conﬂict could be
even higher if V (i,j) >R- and hence no conﬂict were to occur - for some realizations of the shocks.
12Corollary 1 is our central theoretical result, which we test directly in the empirical section. Even
though this result is obtained under a series of simpliﬁcations and abstractions, it highlights the
general logic of the relation among common issues, interactions across states, long-term relatedness,
and probability of conﬂict. As we will see, this result is indeed consistent with the empirical
evidence.
2.3.2 Extension
We now relax Assumption 1 and extend the analysis to the more general case in which the extent
of disagreement ∆ij(k)=|x∗
i(k) − x∗
j(k)| is not necessarily equal to 1 for all issues, but may vary
in functions of the inherited characteristics of the two states.21 A priori, the relationship between
inherited characteristics and extent of disagreement can go either way. On the one hand, it is
possible that culturally closer population may face less disagreement over non-rival common issues
(e.g., about the characteristics of speciﬁc international public goods), which, other things being
equal, would reduce the probability of conﬂict. On the other hand, two closely related populations
who care a lot about the same non-rival issue may also have strongly divergent preferences over
the details of how the issue should be settled, and hence be farther away in their ideal points
(for example, two closely related population that care about the same religious or cultural issue
may also greatly diverge in their ideal outcomes). In what follows we present a simple and direct
formalization linking the extent of disagreement to the distance in inherited characteristics, and
study the relation between probability of conﬂict and genetic distance in this more general setting
(in Section 4 we will present some evidence on voting patterns at the United Nations that empirically
sheds some light on the relation between relatedness and the extent of agreement or disagreement
over international issues).
Assume that for any set of issues between any two points on the real line, a fraction ρ is rival
and a fraction (1 − ρ) is non-rival, and that the extent of disagreement over non-rival common
issues between state i and state j may depend on the distance in inherited characteristics V (i,j):
∆ij(k)=∆0 + δV(i,j) (20)
where ∆0 ≥ 0 and δ is a parameter measuring the relation between distance V (i,j) and disagreement
∆ij(k),a n dk is a non-rival issue. The other assumptions of our model are maintained. In particular,
21Clearly if ∆ij(k) is independent of V (i,j) for all issues, the qualitative results from the basic setting will not be
aﬀected.
13it is still the case that all states at a distance V (i,j) >Rshare no common issues, and hence face
no conﬂict. For states at a distance V (i,j) ≤ R, violent conﬂict is the only equilibrium if and only
if α[ρ+( 1− ρ)∆0][R − V (i,j)] >ω . To simplify notation, we assume that all relevant issues share
the same α (the results would not change qualitatively if we assume that relevant rival issues enter
the utility function with parameter αr > 0 while non-rival issues enter with parameter αnr > 0).
Assuming again that ω is a random variable distributed uniformly between 0 and ω,w en o wh a v e :
Proposition 2





[ρ +( 1− ρ)∆0]R − [ρ +( 1− ρ)(∆0 − δ)]V (i,j) − (1 − ρ)δ[V (i,j)]2ª
(21)




0) if δ is small enough:
δ<
ρ +( 1− ρ)∆0
(1 − ρ)[1 − 2V (i,j)]
(22)
The above inequality is always satisﬁed if δ ≤ 0. If δ>0, the inequality is more easily satisﬁed the
larger the fraction of rival issues ρ, and the larger the extent of disagreement which is independent
of distance ∆0. An analogous condition can be stated in terms of expected probability of conﬂict
and genetic distance. By taking expectations of the above Prob(Conflict), using the facts that




E{V (i,j)2 | g(i,j)=2 } =4 ε2,w eh a v e :




{[ρ +( 1− ρ)(∆0 − δ)]ε +2 ( 1− ρ)δε2}
which immediately implies:
Corollary 2
Expected conﬂict is decreasing in genetic distance (i.e., E[Prob(Conflict) | g(i,j)=2 ]<
E[Prob(Conflict) | g(i,j)=1 ] ) if:
δ<
ρ +( 1− ρ)∆0
(1 − ρ)ε(1 − 2ε)
(24)
Consequently, an inverse relationship between conﬂict and genetic distance is consistent with a
small or negative eﬀect of distance V (i,j) on the extent of disagreement over non-rival issues,
and/or with a predominance of rival issues in international disputes.
14In general, the net eﬀect of relatedness on conﬂict depends on the relative size of the diﬀerent
eﬀects, and is therefore an empirical question. As we will see, our empirical ﬁndings document
a strong and robust negative eﬀect of genetic distance on the probability of conﬂict. In other
words, empirically we ﬁnd that more closely related states ﬁght more with each other, which is the
implication of our basic setting. These ﬁndings are therefore consistent with a predominant role
for the common-issue eﬀect, which prevails over possible countervailing eﬀects (such as the "extent
of disagreement" eﬀect presented above or the "coordination failure" eﬀect discussed in Appendix
1).
The basic results presented in this section could be viewed as the reduced forms of more de-
tailed and micro-founded settings in which speciﬁc interactions and common issues emerge from
more complex dynamic processes and decisions. For example, societies with more similar long-
term characteristics might endogenously end up with more similar production systems and/or
consumption patterns, which may induce them to compete over a similar set of resources. Another
(non-mutually exclusive) channel would emerge if genealogically more similar populations face lower
ﬁxed costs to interacting with each other, and therefore have more incentives and opportunities to
interact over all sorts of common issues, multiplying the likelihood that some of those issues will
be disputed. These interpretations are consistent with our simpliﬁed framework, as they predict a
negative relationship between genetic distance and the probability of conﬂict.
3D a t a a n d M e t h o d o l o g y
Our model shows that the degree of relatedness between populations has a positive eﬀect on their
conﬂict propensities due to a larger set of common issues (corollary 1). Genealogical relatedness
may also aﬀect diﬀerences in ideal points (corollary 2) and may aﬀect the likelihood of reaching
peaceful conﬂict resolution by facilitating coordination (corollary 3 in Appendix 1). Thus, the net
eﬀect of relatedness on conﬂict is a priori ambiguous. In the remainder of this paper we examine
empirically the determinants of bilateral conﬂict across states, focusing on the degree of relatedness
between the populations of each pair of countries. We control for other determinants of bilateral
conﬂict, in particular a wide range of measures of geographic distance.
153.1 Measuring Conﬂict
We use panel data on interstate conﬂict between 1816 and 2001 from the Correlates of War Project
(www.correlatesofwar.org).22 We start from a discrete indicator of the intensity of a bilateral conﬂict
between countries i and j in year t. The indicator takes on a value from 0 for no militarized conﬂict
to 5 for an interstate war involving more than 1,000 total battle deaths. Following the convention
in the literature, we deﬁne dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the intensity of militarized conﬂict
is equal to or greater than 3. Our main dependent variable is this binary indicator of conﬂict,
denoted Cijt. We separately examine the determinants of the intensity of conﬂict, as well as the
determinants of war (corresponding to a conﬂict intensity of 5). The database includes several
other useful bilateral variables such as war casualties, an indicator of whether a pair is linked by
an active military alliance, the number of other wars occurring in a given year and the number of
peaceful years in a country pair (i,j) at each time t. We make use of these variables in the analysis
below.
3.2 Measuring Relatedness
To capture genealogical relatedness, we use genetic distance. Since the interpretation and construc-
tion of this measure was discussed in detail in Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009), we provide only a
short overview. Genetic distance is a summary measure of diﬀerences in allele frequencies across a
range of neutral genes (or chromosomal loci) .T h em e a s u r ew eu s em o s t l y ,FST genetic distance,
captures the length of time since two populations became separated from each other. When two
populations split apart, random genetic mutations result in genetic diﬀerentiation over time. The
longer the separation time, the greater the genetic distance computed from a set of neutral genes.
In other words, FST genetic distance is a direct measure of genealogical relatedness, resulting from
a molecular clock. The speciﬁc source for our data is Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994), pp. 75-76.23
Our focus is on a set of 42 world populations for which there is data on bilateral genetic distance,
computed from 120 neutral alleles. Among the set of 42 world populations, the maximum genetic
distance is between Mbuti Pygmies and Papua New-Guineans (FST =0 .4573), and the minimum
22See also Jones et. al. (1996) and Faten et al. (2004).
23Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) also provide data on Nei genetic distance, a measure that is diﬀerent but highly
correlated with FST distance. Our results are robust to using Nei distance rather than FST distance. Corresponding
estimates are available upon request.
16is between the Danish and the English (FST =0 .0021). The mean genetic distance among the 861
available pairs is 0.1338.
While the data on genetic distance is available at the level of populations, the rest of our
data is at the country-pair level. It was therefore necessary to match genetic groups to countries.
The procedure to match populations to countries is described in detail in Spolaore and Wacziarg
(2009). To summarize, each of the 42 groups was matched to almost all of the 1,120 ethnic groups
in Alesina et al. (2003). The same source provides the distribution of these ethnic groups across
virtually all the countries in the world. Thus, we could construct measures of genetic distance
between countries, rather than groups. We constructed two such measures. The ﬁrst was the
distance between the plurality ethnic groups of each country in a pair, i.e. the groups with the
largest shares of each country’s population. The second was a measure of weighted genetic distance,
constructed as follows: assume that country i is composed of populations m =1 ...M and country
j is composed of populations n =1 ...N.D e n o t e b y s1m the share of population m in country i
(similarly for country j)a n ddmn the genetic distance between populations m and n.T h ew e i g h t e d







(sim × sjn × dmn) (25)
where skm is the share of group m in country k, dmn is the FST genetic distance between groups m
and n. This represents the expected genetic distance between two randomly selected individuals,
one from each country. Weighted genetic distance is very highly correlated with genetic distance
based on plurality groups (the correlation is 91.9%), so for practical purposes it does not make
ab i gd i ﬀerence which one we use. We will use the weighted FST distance as the baseline mea-
sure throughout this study, as it is a more precise measure of average genetic distance between
countries.24
The match of populations to countries pertains to the contemporary period, after the great
migrations that followed the conquest of the New World. Hence, for instance, for the current
period the plurality population in Australia is the English population. To address bias resulting
from errors in the match populations to countries for the current period, as well as concerns that
current genetic distance may be endogenous with respect to past wars, we also matched countries
24All our results are robust to using genetic distance between plurality groups rather than weighted genetic distance.
The corresponding estimates are available upon request.
17to their 1500 AD populations. Hence, for instance, in the 1500 match, Australia is matched to
Aborigines. Genetic distance between countries using the 1500 match can be used as an instrument
for current genetic distance.25
3.3 Summary Statistics
Table 1 and 2 provide summary statistics that can help to give a sense of the data and provide
clues concerning the relationship between conﬂict and relatedness.26 T h eb a s e l i n es a m p l ei sa n
unbalanced panel of 517,251 observations covering 13,575 country pairs, based on 176 underlying
countries, from 1816 to 2000. Table 1 displays the means of genetic distance, geodesic distance and
a dummy variable for contiguity between the two countries in a pair, conditional on the intensity
of conﬂict. The mean of genetic distance when there is no militarized conﬂict (0.102) is greater
than at any other level of the conﬂict intensity indicator (for hostility levels ranging from 2 to 5,
the mean of genetic distance ranges from 0.050 to 0.063), consistent with Corollary 1. Somewhat
to our surprise, a relatively small portion of full ﬂedged-wars occur between contiguous countries
(18.2%), and the mean geodesic distance separating countries at war is relatively high (5,562 km).
Table 2 shows the conditional frequency of both wars and conﬂicts. Wars are a relatively rare
occurrence, as only 1,010 pair-year observations are characterized as wars, out of more than half
a million observations. Over a quarter of these wars occurred between countries in the bottom
decile of genetic distance, and almost half of all wars occurred in pairs in the bottom quartile.
Only 44 wars were observed in pairs in the top quartile, of which 32 involved South Africa as
one of the combatants. While South Africa is characterized as genetically distant from European
populations due to the large African majority, a historical examination of wars involving South
Africa reveals that the wars were spurred mainly by conﬂicts over issues separating European powers
and South Africa’s European power elite. In sum, there are very few wars between genetically
distant populations in our sample. Even wars occurring across large geographic distances typically
25Since we do not have detailed data on ethnic composition going back to 1500, the corresponding match only refers
to plurality groups. The matching of countries to populations for 1500 is more straightforward than for the current
period, since Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) attempted to sample populations as they were in 1500, likely reducing
the extent of measurement error. The correlation between weighted genetic distance matched using current period
populations and genetic distance between plurality groups as of 1500 is 0.714 in our baseline sample.
26Appendix 2 provides further summary statistics for the main variables in our study, in the form of means and
correlations, to aid in the interpretation of our empirical results.
18involve mostly genetically similar participants - for instance it is still the case that almost half of
the wars occurring between non-contiguous countries involved country pairs in the bottom quartile
of genetic distance. Similar observations hold when we consider more broadly militarized conﬂicts
rather than wars per se: while there are vastly more of these conﬂicts (3,728 versus 1,010), the
relative frequency by quartile of genetic distance is roughly preserved. Similarly, the proportions do
not change very much when conditioning on geographic distance being large between the countries
in a pair - countries not sharing a common sea or ocean, non-contiguous countries, or countries
that are more than 1,000 kilometers apart.
3.4 Empirical Speciﬁcation
While these summary statistics are an informative starting point, we turn to a more formal regres-
sion setup, allowing us to control for a wide range of determinants of interstate militarized conﬂicts.
As a starting point for our empirical speciﬁcation, we follow the practice in the existing literature
(for instance Bremer, 1992, Martin, Mayer and Thoenig, 2008) of regressing a binary indicator of
interstate conﬂict on a set of bilateral determinants. The baseline regression equation is:
Cijt = βXijt + γFSTW
ij + εijt (26)
The vector Xijt contains a series of controls such as a contiguity dummy, log geodesic distance, log
longitudinal and latitudinal distance, several other indicators of geographic isolation, as well as a set
of dummy variables representing whether both countries in the pair are democracies, whether they
were ever in a colonial relationship, whether they belong to an active military alliance, among other
controls. The choice of controls follows the existing literature closely, particularly the contribution
of Martin, Mayer and Thoenig (2008). A major diﬀerence is that we greatly augment the list of
geographic controls compared to existing contributions, in an eﬀort to identify separately the eﬀects
of geographic proximity from those of genealogical relatedness. It is important for our purposes
to adequately control for geographic isolation as genetic distance and geographic isolation tend to
be correlated (for instance the correlation between FST genetic distance and log geodesic distance
in our baseline sample is 0.404). Equation (26) is estimated using probit, clustering standard
errors at the country-pair level. Throughout, we report marginal eﬀects evaluated at the mean
of the independent variables, providing a quantitative assessment of the magnitude of the eﬀects.
Because the proportion of pair-year observations with conﬂicts is only 0.721%,t oi m p r o v et h e
readability of the marginal eﬀects we multiplied all of them by 100 in all tables.
194 Empirical Results
4.1 Baseline Estimates
Table 3 presents baseline estimates of the coeﬃcients in equation (26). We start with a univariate
regression (column 1), showing a very strong negative relationship between genetic distance and the
incidence of militarized conﬂict. The magnitude of this eﬀect is large, with a one standard deviation
change in genetic distance (0.066) associated with a 0.492 decline in the percentage probability of
conﬂict (the mean of this variable, again, is 0.721). Obviously, this estimate is tainted by omitted
variables bias, stemming mainly from the omission of geographic factors. Column (2) introduces
eight measures of geographic distance. These measures usually bear the expected signs, and their
inclusion greatly reduces the eﬀect of genetic distance.27 However, this eﬀect remains negative and
highly signiﬁcant statistically. Its magnitude is still substantial - a one standard deviation shift
in genetic distance is associated with a reduction in the probability of conﬂict of 12.15% of that
variable’s mean.
Several other factors have been proposed as correlates of war. Chief among them is the central
tenet of liberal peace theory, namely the idea that democracies tend not to go to war with each
other. A dummy variable equal to 1 if both countries are democracies (deﬁned as a combined
Polity score greater than 5) has a negative and highly signiﬁcant marginal eﬀect, with roughly the
same magnitude as that of genetic distance. Column 3 includes other controls such as whether
countries in a pair ever had colonial ties, the number of peaceful years prior to the current year,
the number of wars taking place globally at time t, and whether the two countries are members of
the same alliance. All of these bear coeﬃcients with the expected signs. Once all these controls
are included, the coeﬃcient on genetic distance falls further, but remains negative and signiﬁcant
at the 1% level. The eﬀect of a one standard deviation shift in genetic distance, with the full set
of controls, remains equal to 8.52% of the mean probability of conﬂict. We continue to condition
on this full set of controls in all the regressions that follow.
None of these observations change very much when using a logit estimator rather than a probit
estimator (column 4). We continue to use a probit estimator in the rest of this paper. Finally,
27Similarly, excluding genetic distance from the baseline speciﬁcation generally raises the magnitude of the geo-
graphic eﬀects, particularly that of log geodesic distance (results are available upon request). Thus, the exclusion
of relatedness from past empirical speciﬁcations seeking to explain conﬂict likely led to overstating the quantitative
impact of geographic factors.
20in column 5, we instrument for genetic distance using genetic distance between populations as
they were in 1500. The results are very close to those previously reported, but the eﬀect of
genetic distance rises by over 50% relative to the estimates of column 3, suggesting that the latter
understated the eﬀect. It is likely that the higher eﬀect of genetic distance under IV reﬂects the
fact that measurement error is less prevalent, since arguments about reverse causality or omitted
variables bias would suggest that instrumenting should reduce the eﬀect of genetic distance. To
adopt a conservative approach, we refrain from instrumenting for genetic distance in the bulk of our
analysis, keeping in mid that our reported eﬀect is likely an understatement of the true magnitude.
4.2 Estimates Across Time and Space
To examine if speciﬁc periods or regions account for the ﬁnding of a negative eﬀect of relatedness on
conﬂict, we broke down the sample by time period and region. Results are presented in Tables 4 and
5. We ﬁnd that results are remarkably robust within regions and periods. Table 4 shows that the
coeﬃcient on genetic distance is negative and roughly of the same magnitude whether considering
the pre- or post-1900 periods. The coeﬃcient for the pre-1900 period is not statistically signiﬁcant,
perhaps because there are many fewer observations in the early periods (only 799 country pairs as
opposed to 13,175 for the broader sample), and few observations with conﬂict (436 out of a total
of 3,728 conﬂicts in the broader sample). Focusing on the 20th century, the eﬀect is particularly
pronounced and signiﬁcant for the post 1946 period - in other words our ﬁnding is not simply an
artifact of the Second World War, which pitted a lot of European populations against each other.28
In fact, our ﬁnding holds even after the end of the Cold War (column 7). The coeﬃcient is negative
whatever the subperiod under consideration.
Turning to the regional breakdown in Table 5, we again uncover a negative eﬀect of genetic
distance on conﬂict whatever the region under consideration. Column (2) starts by including a
dummy variable taking on a value of one if both countries in a pair are part of the same continent
(continents are deﬁned as Africa, Americas, Asia, Europe, and Oceania). The concern is that
conﬂicts occur predominantly among countries located on the same continent (this was the case
for 2,086 out of a total of 3,728 conﬂicts in our baseline sample), and that populations located on
the same continent tend to be genetically close (the mean of FST genetic distance for pairs on the
282,053 observations involve militarized conﬂicts in the post 1946 period, while the 1939-1946 period involved 634
bilateral conﬂict-years, or 17% of the total number of observations with conﬂicts between 1816 and 2001.
21same continent is 0.066 versus a sample-wide mean of 0.102). However, the inclusion of the same
continent dummy hardly changes the coeﬃcient on genetic distance at all.
Column (3) presents results for Europe. For this continent, we observe a separate matrix of
FST genetic distances, available for almost all the countries in Europe.29 Despite the paucity of
observations (only 291 country pairs), the eﬀect of genetic distance remains negative and signiﬁcant
at the 5% level. A one standard deviation change in genetic distance reduces the probability of
conﬂict by 12.531% of its mean, a magnitude slightly larger than, but roughly in line with, the
results found in the World sample. Columns (4) through (6) provide estimates for Asia, Africa and
the Americas (there were no conﬂicts within Oceania in our baseline sample, so this category is
missing). The coeﬃcient on genetic distance is consistently negative, and signiﬁcant at the 10%
level for Asia and Africa, but small and insigniﬁcant for the Americas.30 Overall, the regional
breakdown suggests that the negative eﬀect of relatedness on war is remarkably consistent across
space, the results within Europe, where genetic distance is small, being particularly striking.
4.3 Adding Linguistic and Religious Distance
W h i l eg e n e t i cd i s t a n c ei sap r e c i s ea n dc o n t i n u o us measure of the degree of relatedness between
populations and countries, alternative measures exist. The existing literature on interstate conﬂict
has examined linguistic and religious ties in an eﬀort to tell apart primordialist theories of con-
ﬂict from instrumentalist theories (Richardson, 1960, Henderson, 1997). Thus, it is important to
evaluate whether these variables trump genetic distance, and more generally how their inclusion
aﬀects our main coeﬃcient of interest. Linguistic relatedness is associated with genetic relatedness
because, like genes, languages are transmitted intergenerationally: populations speaking similar
languages are likely to be more related than linguistically distinct populations (Cavalli-Sforza et
al., 1994).31 Religious beliefs, also transmitted intergenerationally, are one type of diﬀerence in
29Details concerning the FST genetic distance matrix for the European continent can be found in Spolaore and
Wacziarg (2009). There are only 5 distinct European populations in the worldwide matrix, so estimates using the
European matrix, where there are 26 d i s t i n c tg e n e t i cg r o u p s ,a r el i k e l yt ob em u c hm o r er e l i a b l e .
30The number of intracontinental interstate conﬂicts experienced by these continents were 787 (Asia), 252 (Africa)
and 433 (Americas).
31On the other hand, there are many reasons why genetic and linguistic distance are imperfectly correlated. Rates
of genetic and linguistic mutations may diﬀer; populations of a certain genetic make-up may adopt a foreign language
as the results of the edict of foreign rulers, as happened when the Magyar rulers imposed their language on the
22human traits that can lead to conﬂict. In what follows, we evaluate whether the eﬀect of genetic
distance is reduced or eliminated when controlling for linguistic and religious distance, and whether
these variables have an independent eﬀect on the incidence of interstate conﬂict.32
Prior to showing the results, we brieﬂy discuss how these measures were constructed. To capture
linguistic distance, we used the data and approach in Fearon (2003), making use of linguistic trees
from Ethnologue to compute the number of common linguistic nodes between languages in the
world, a measure of their linguistic similarity (the linguistic tree in this dataset involves up to
15 nested classiﬁcations, so two countries with populations speaking the same language will share
15 common nodes).33 Using data on the distribution of each linguistic group within and across
countries, from the same source, we again computed a measure of the number of common nodes
shared by languages spoken by plurality groups within each country in a pair. We also computed
a weighted measure of linguistic similarity, representing the expected number of common linguistic
nodes between two randomly chosen individuals, one from each country in a pair (the formula is
analogous to that of equation 25).34 Following Fearon (2003), we transformed these measures so
that they reﬂect linguistic distance (LD) rather than similarity, and are bounded by 0 and 1:
LD =
r
(15 − # Common Nodes)
15
(27)
Hungarian population. Other salient examples include countries were colonized by European powers, adopting their
language (English, French, Portuguese or Spanish), while maintaining very distinct populations genetically. See
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) for an in-depth discussion of these points.
32Pairwise correlations between measures of genetic, linguistic and religious distances appear in Appendix 2, panel
b. These correlations are generally positive, as expected, but not very large. For instance, the correlation between
FST genetic distance and weighted linguistic distance is 0.164. Religious distance bears a correlation of 0.544 with
linguistic distance, and 0.210 with genetic distance.
33As an alternative, we used a separate measure of linguistic distance, based on lexicostatistics, from Dyen, Kruskal
and Black (1992). This is a more continuous measure than the one based on common nodes, but it is only available
for countries speaking Indo-European languages. It captures the number of common meanings, out of a list of 200,
that are conveyed using "cognate" or related words. Summing over the 200 meanings, a measure of linguistic distance
is the percentage of non-cognate words. Using the expected (weighted) measure of cognate distance led to eﬀects of
genetic distance very similar to those obtained when controlling for the Fearon measure, albeit on a much smaller
sample of countries speaking Indo-European languages. These results are available upon request.
34The two measures deviate from each other whenever a country includes populations speaking diﬀerent languages.
Using the measure based on the plurality language or the weigthed measure did not make any diﬀerence for our
results. As we did for genetic distance, we focus on weighted measures.
23To measure religious distance we followed an approach based on religious trees, similar to that
used for linguistic distance, using a nomenclature of world religions obtained from Mecham, Fearon
and Laitin (2006). This nomenclature provides a family tree of World religions, ﬁrst distinguishing
between monotheistic religions of Middle-Eastern origin, Asian religions and "others", and further
subdividing these categories into ﬁner groups (such as Christians, Muslims and Jews, etc.). The
number of common classiﬁcations (up to 5 in this dataset) is a measure of religious similarity. We
matched religions to countries using Mecham, Fearon and Laitin’s (2006) data on the prevalence of
religions by country and transformed the data in a manner similar to that in equation (27), again
computing plurality and weighted distances separately.
Table 6 presents estimates of the eﬀect of genetic distance on the propensity for interstate conﬂict
when linguistic and religious distance are included. Since the use of these variables constrains the
sample (a loss of some 77,081 observations, or almost 15% of the sample), we start in column (1)
with the baseline estimates for this new sample: they are in line with those reported above. When
adding linguistic distance and religious distance either alone or together (columns 2-4), interesting
results emerge. First, the coeﬃcient on genetic distance is barely aﬀected. Second, linguistic
distance exerts a null eﬀect when controlling for genetic distance. Third, religious distance is
negatively related with conﬂict, though the eﬀect is only signiﬁcant at the 7.6% level, and its
signiﬁcance level drops to 13% when including linguistic distance along with religious distance.35
This latter ﬁnding, while weak, is consistent with the view that religion is one of the vertically
transmitted traits that make populations more or less related to each other, and its eﬀect on
conﬂict goes in the same direction as that of genetic distance, a broader measure of relatedness.
4.4 Nonlinearities and Determinants of Conﬂict Intensity
In this subsection, we consider several extensions of our baseline speciﬁcation. Our goal is to
characterize whether relatedness may operate diﬀerently for diﬀerent pairs of countries, and to
investigate its eﬀect on the intensity of conﬂict. To do so, we ﬁrst look for interactive and nonlinear
eﬀects of genetic distance (Table 7). We then seek to evaluate the eﬀect of genetic distance on the
intensity of conﬂict, rather than on a binary indicator of conﬂict incidence (Table 8).
35This result contrasts with that in Henderson (1997), who found evidence that religious similarity was negatively
related to conﬂict. The diﬀerence may stem from a much bigger sample in our work, as well as our inclusion of a
much broader set of controls (Henderson only controlled for contiguity).
24We ﬁrst isolate countries that are non contiguous. In the baseline sample, 34% of conﬂicts
occur between contiguous countries, and isolating pairs composed of non-contiguous countries is a
further way to control for geographic proximity. The standardized eﬀect of genetic distance actually
rises modestly, as a one standard deviation increase in genetic distance is associated with a 9.41%
decrease in the mean probability of conﬂict (versus 8.52% in the baseline regression). This reinforces
our conﬁdence that the eﬀect is not driven by geographic distance or other possibly omitted factors
speciﬁc to contiguous countries.
In columns (3) through (5) of Table 7 we add several interaction terms to the baseline spec-
iﬁcation. The eﬀect of genetic distance does not appear quantitatively more or less pronounced
for pairs that are contiguous, for pairs that are geographically proximate (i.e. countries are either
contiguous or separated by a distance less than 2,500 km), or for pairs that include a major power.
We then allow for a linear spline, i.e. a diﬀerent slope for the eﬀect of genetic distance whether
it is greater than the sample median of 0.095, or lower. Column (6) shows no evidence of such
ad i ﬀerential eﬀect (varying the spline threshold did not matter greatly). Finally, introducing a
squared term in genetic distance (column 7) does not reveal much evidence of a nonlinear eﬀect.
In sum, we ﬁnd no evidence that the eﬀect of genetic distance depends on some characteristic of
the pairs, or that it is nonlinear.
Table 8 seeks to explain the intensity of militarized conﬂict as opposed to its incidence only. To
do so, we modiﬁed the dependent variable in several ways. Column (1) simply uses the measure of
the intensity of conﬂict from the Correlates of War dataset, rather than the binary transform of this
variable we have been using so far. With least squares estimation, there is evidence that genetic
distance bears a negative relationship with conﬂict intensity. However, column (2), which limits
the sample to pairs having experienced conﬂict, demonstrates that genetic distance does not aﬀect
the intensity of conﬂict (among levels 3, 4 and 5) once we condition on the subsample with conﬂict.
This result rationalizes our focus on a bilateral measure of conﬂict rather than on the continuous
measure. In line with results in Table 3, instrumenting for genetic distance based on the current
match of populations to countries using genetic distance based on the 1500 match increases the
estimated magnitude of the eﬀect by 64% (column 3).
In columns (4) and (5) we consider the determinants of war casualties. We ﬁnd that genetic
distance reduces war casualties, but again this eﬀect is almost entirely driven by the extensive mar-
gin, since genetic distance has a statistically insigniﬁcant eﬀect on war casualties for observations
25with nonzero casualties. Our last test is to redeﬁne the dependent variable as a binary indicator
of war, i.e. a dummy variable taking on a value of one if conﬂict intensity is 5 (corresponding to
conﬂicts with more than 1,000 total battle deaths). Genetic distance reduces the propensity for
war in a statistically signiﬁcant way: a standard deviation increase in genetic distance reduces the
probability of full-blown war by 2.956% of this variable’s mean, an eﬀect quantitatively smaller
than that on conﬂict more broadly (the underlying probability of a country pair-year being at war
in our baseline sample is relatively low, on the order of 0.195%).
To summarize, the eﬀect of genetic distance is very robust to using alternative measures of con-
ﬂict, but we uncover little evidence that genetic distance aﬀects the intensity of conﬂict conditional
on a conﬂict occurring.
4.5 Analysis for the 1950-2000 period
Several important correlates of war, such as measures of trade intensity and diﬀerences in income,
are missing from our speciﬁcation due to their lack of availability over the long time period covered
by the baseline speciﬁcation (1816-2001). In order to incorporate these additional controls, we
focus on the 1950-2000 period for which various measures of trade and income are available.
A long tradition associated with liberal peace theory, going back to Montesquieu (1748) and
Kant (1795), holds that extensive bilateral commercial links between countries reduces the probabil-
ity of conﬂict, essentially by raising its cost, since valuable trade links would be lost in a militarized
conﬂict. In an important paper, Martin, Mayer and Thoenig (2008, henceforth MMT) added an
additional hypothesis: if the countries in a pair trade a lot with third parties, their bilateral trading
link matters less, so controlling for bilateral trade, multilateral trade intensity should increase the
probability of conﬂict among the countries in a pair. The issue we face is that the omission of
these trade terms may bias the coeﬃcient estimate on genetic distance, to the extent that genetic
distance and trade are correlated.
We obtained the same data on bilateral and multilateral trade openness used in MMT’s paper,
and included their measures of trade in our baseline speciﬁcation.36 These measures include a
metric of bilateral trade openness (the ratio of bilateral imports to GDP, averaged across the two
countries in a pair), a metric of multilateral trade intensity (deﬁned as the ratio of the sum of
all bilateral imports from third countries to GDP, averaged between the two countries in a pair),
36The data was obtained from http://team.univ-paris1.fr/teamperso/mayer/data/data.htm
26and the interaction of each of these metrics with log geodesic distance. All of these measures were
lagged by 4 years to limit the incidence of reverse causality running from conﬂict to trade, exactly
as was done in MMT.
Results appear in Table 9. In column (1), we replicate the baseline speciﬁcation for the smaller
sample covering 1950-2000. We are able to exactly recover the pattern of coeﬃcients on the trade
terms as the one reported in MMT: bilateral openness reduces conﬂict, multilateral openness raises
conﬂict, and these eﬀects are more pronounced quantitatively for pairs that are closer to each other.
Our ﬁnding lend further support to liberal peace theory, as recently amended by MMT. The eﬀect of
genetic distance in this sample is slightly smaller than in the 1816-2001 sample: a standard deviation
increase in genetic distance reduces the probability of conﬂict by 6.612% of this variable’s mean.
Adding the trade terms in column (2), this eﬀect falls further, but remains negative and highly
signiﬁcant statistically. In column (3), we include additional trade-related variables, a dummy for
whether the two countries in a pair belong to a free trade area, and the number of GATT members
in the pair. The coeﬃcient on genetic distance is barely aﬀected.
Another omitted variables concern stems from the results in Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009),
where genetic distance was found to be robustly correlated with absolute diﬀerences in per capita
income across pairs of countries. To the extent that diﬀerences in income capture power imbalances,
or the extent of possible spoils of war, they may inﬂuence the probability of conﬂict (this could
go in either direction: power imbalances may make a weaker prey easier to capture militarily, but
also more willing to surrender peacefully). In column (5), we add the absolute value of log income
diﬀerences (the same variable used as a dependent variable in Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009) to
the speciﬁcation that includes the broadest set of controls (including trade controls from MMT).37
The coeﬃcient on income diﬀerences is positive and signiﬁcant, indicating that heterogeneity in
income levels across the countries in a pair is conducive to conﬂict, but its inclusion does not aﬀect
the coeﬃcient on genetic distance. Finally, column (6) substitutes the absolute diﬀerence in total
GDP instead of diﬀerences in per capita GDP. Heterogeneity in total GDP does not aﬀect conﬂict
propensity, and its inclusion does not aﬀect the coeﬃcient on genetic distance.
To summarize, the inclusion of a wide set of trade-related controls and of income diﬀerences,
while conﬁrming past results in MMT, does not change the basic message that relatedness has a
positive eﬀect on conﬂict.
37The source for the income data is the Penn World Tables, version 6.1 (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2002).
274.6 Analysis of UN voting patterns
In our theoretical framework, Corollary 2 suggests that one way relatedness could aﬀect conﬂict is
through its eﬀect on the degree of similarity in countries’ ideal points over non rival issues. Stated
simply, related populations may have more or less similar preferences over sets of international
issues, quite apart from the eﬀect of relatedness on the range of issues relevant to the pair, stemming
from past interactions. In the theory section, we remained agnostic as to the possible direction of
this relationship. In this subsection we seek to uncover empirically the direction of the eﬀect by
analyzing the degree of countries’ similarity in stated preferences over global diplomatic issues. To
do so, we use data on their voting patterns at the UN General Assembly. The data comes from
Gartzke (2006), who states that "dozens or hundreds of resolutions appear in each session of the
General Assembly." Most of these votes constitute symbolic position taking by UN members, who
usually do not have a direct stake in the issue they vote on. Another advantage of this data is that
all UN members take positions (including abstaining) on a constant set of issues.
Based on data on votes themselves, Gartzke constructed an index of the "aﬃnity of nations",
which is simply the bilateral correlation of votes for each country pair in a given year. The measure
ranges from −1 to 1 and is available from 1946 to 2002. Two separate indices are available depending
on whether abstentions are considered a form of position taking, or excluded. We use both indices
as dependent variables to examine the eﬀect of genetic distance on the degree of similarity in
preferences over diplomatic issues considered at the UN General Assembly. We maintain the same
baseline speciﬁcation used to estimate the determinants of conﬂicts (Table 3, column 3), regressing
UN vote correlation indices on genetic distance, geographic distance and other controls.
Estimates suggest that genetic distance is positively associated with UN vote correlations. That
is, countries that are more related have more diﬀerent preferences over issues arising at the UN
Assembly. Column (2) of Table 10 shows this is the case unconditionally. The eﬀect remains
positive and signiﬁcant when including a set of geographic and historical controls (columns 2 and
3). The eﬀect remains when considering only the 1990-2000 time period where votes were less
likely to be aligned with the major geopolitical blocs of the Cold War era. The eﬀect is also robust
to excluding abstensions from the calculation of UN vote correlations. In terms of magnitude,
using the baseline regression of column (3), a one standard deviation increase in genetic distance is
associated with an increase in the UN vote correlation equal to 10.10% of this variables standard
deviation, i.e. the standardized beta is 10.10%. This standardized measure of magnitude rises to
2811.49% when excluding abstentions.
To summarize, this evidence suggests that any positive eﬀect of relatedness on conﬂict arising
from the role of past interactions in generating grievances is likely to be reinforced by the negative
eﬀect of relatedness on preference similarity (in the parlance of our model, δ is negative).
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we examined the empirical relationship between the occurrence of international
conﬂicts and the degree of relatedness between countries. We found that populations that are
genetically closer are more prone to engage in militarized conﬂicts with each other, even after
controlling for a wide set of measures of geographic distance, income diﬀerences, and other factors
aﬀecting conﬂict, including measures of bilateral and multilateral trade and diﬀerences in democracy
levels. We also provided a theoretical model of conﬂict and relatedness that is consistent with these
results. In the simplest version of our model, populations that share a more recent common history
have had less time to diverge in preferences and characteristics that determine the set of common
issues they care about, and over which they are prone to ﬁght.
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper that documents a link between genetic distance and
international conﬂict, and provides an interpretation in terms of cultural and historical related-
ness. As we have discussed in the introduction, our results provide strong evidence against the
primordialist view that cultural and ethnic dissimilarity should breed war and plunder.
More broadly, this paper is part of a growing literature in political economy focusing on the
eﬀects of long-term cultural and historical variables on political, economic and institutional out-
comes, both theoretically and empirically. It would be interesting to link our approach to the
extensive literature on ethnic fractionalization and polarization within countries (see Alesina et al.
2003, Fearon, 2003) and to study the eﬀects of long-term genealogical relatedness across groups
on civil conﬂicts and other intrastate outcomes. A positive relationship between relatedness and
conﬂict within states would be consistent, for example, with the ﬁnding in Fearon and Laitin (2003)
that ethnic fractionalization and civil wars are unrelated. Further research on this question should
focus on reliable subnational data on inter-group relatedness.38
38Another area of research where our approach could be fruitful is the study of national formation and breakup,
and their connections with international conﬂict (Spolaore, 2004; Alesina and Spolaore, 2005, 2006) and civil conﬂict
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Appendix 1: Coordination Failure
We can further extend our basic framework by relaxing Assumption 2 (that is, by allowing for
the possibility of coordination failure). As we have noted in Section 2, (C,C) is always a Nash
equilibrium (Remark 1). Nonetheless, both states would be better oﬀ with a peaceful negotiation
than with violent conﬂict (C,C), because of the costs of war, which are not borne in a peaceful
outcome. As we have seen, if (NC,NC) is a Nash equilibrium, it is the unique coalition-proof
Nash equilibrium, as deﬁned by Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston (1987). But what if states fail to
coordinate on such superior (NC,NC) equilibrium, and end up in the inferior (C,C) equilibrium,
even when the conditions for a peaceful equilibrium are satisﬁed? And what if such coordination
failure were to be more likely across populations that are genealogically more distant, since their
norms, habits, languages etc. are likely to be more diﬀerent, and they may therefore ﬁnd commu-
nication and coordination more diﬃcult? If that were the case, such "coordination failure eﬀect"
34would reduce the negative correlation between genetic distance and probability of conﬂict (in con-
trast, if coordination failure were more likely between more closely related populations, the eﬀect
of relatedness on conﬂict would be strengthened).
A formalization of these ideas can be provided as follows. Let χ(i,j) denote the probability
that state i and state j would fail to coordinate on the peaceful outcome when it is an equilibrium,
and assume that such coordination failure is more likely if the states are distant in their preferences
and characteristics, measured by vi and vj. Speciﬁcally, assume that:
χ(i,j)=χ0 + θV(i,j) (A1)
with χ0 ≥ 0 and θ is a parameter measuring the relation between distance V (i,j) and probability of
coordination failure χ(i,j). We also assume that all parameters satisfy the appropriate restrictions
to ensure that 0 ≤ χ(i,j) ≤ 1.T h e r e f o r e ,f o rV (i,j) ≤ R, and assuming again that ω is a random
variable distributed uniformly between 0 and ω,w eh a v e :
Proposition 3
The probability of conﬂict between the two states when all common issues are rival (ρ =1 )c a n
be written as:
Prob{Conflict} = χ(i,j)Prob[α[R − V (i,j)] ≤ ω]+P r o b [ α[R − V (i,j)] >ω ]= (A2)
= χ(i,j)+[ 1− χ(i,j)]
α
ω
[R − V (i,j)]





− R − 2V (i,j)
(A3)
An analogous condition holds for the more general case ρ ≤ 1 (see generalization below).
The above inequality always holds for θ<0. For a positive θ, it is more easily satisﬁed for
smaller χ0, larger α and R, and larger V (i,j).
An analogous condition holds regarding the relation between expected probability of conﬂict
and genetic distance:
Corollary 3
Expected conﬂict is decreasing in genetic distance (i.e., E[Prob(Conflict) | g(i,j)=2 ]<






− R − 2ε]ε
(A4)
Consequently, if observed conﬂict partly stems from coordination failure, an inverse relationship
between conﬂict and genetic distance (as the one we actually observe in the data) is consistent with
a small (or even negative) eﬀect of relatedness on the probability of coordination failure (low θ).
Generalization of Proposition 3 for ρ ≤ 1
For the more general case ρ ≤ 1,w eh a v e :
Prob{Conflict} = χ(i,j)+[ 1− χ(i,j)]Prob{C,C Unique Eq} (A5)
where:




[ρ +( 1− ρ)∆0]R − [ρ +( 1− ρ)(∆0 − δ)]V (i,j) − (1 − ρ)δ[V (i,j)]2ª
(A6)
By substituting χ(i,j)=χ0 + θV(i,j) and taking the derivative of the probability of conﬂict with
respect to distance V (i,j), we have the following generalization of Proposition 3:
The eﬀect of distance V (i,j) on the probability of conﬂict is negative if
θ<
(1 − χ0){ρ +( 1− ρ)(∆0 − δ)+2 ( 1− ρ)δV(i,j)}
ω
α
− [ρ +( 1− ρ)∆0]R − 2[ρ +( 1− ρ)(∆0 − δ)]V (i,j) − 3(1 − ρ)δ[V (i,j)]2
(A7)




− R − 2V (i,j)
for ρ =1(an analogous condition can be




Appendix 2 – Summary statistics and correlations for the main variables in the analysis 
 
 
Panel a – Summary Statistics 
 
Variable  # Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Conflict (%) 
  
517,251 0.721 8.459 0 100 
War (%) 
  
517,251 0.195 4.415 0 100 
Fst genetic distance, weighted 
  
517,251 0.102 0.066 0 0.355 
Log geodesic distance 
  
517,251 8.690 0.816 2.349 9.899 
Dummy for contiguity 
  
517,251 0.026 0.159 0 1 
Religious Distance Index, 
weighted 
443,472 0.811 0.186 .089 1 
Linguistic Distance Index, 
weighted 
440,170 0.944 0.160 0 1 
1 - % cognate measure of 
linguistic distance, weighted 


















War (%)  0.519*  1
(517,251) (517,251)
Fst genetic   -0.058*  -0.026* 1
distance, weighted  (517,251)  (517,251) (517,251)
Log geodesic   -0.101*  -0.033* 0.404* 1
distance (517,251)  (517,251) (517,251) (517,251)
Dummy for   0.168*  0.043* -0.148* -0.391* 1
contiguity (517,251)  (517,251) (517,251) (517,251) (517,251)
Religious Distance   -0.020*  0.001 0.210* 0.243* -0.175* 1 
Index, weighted  (443,472)  (443,472) (443,472) (443,472) (443,472) (443,472) 
Linguistic Distance   -0.035*  -0.001 0.164* 0.255* -0.193* 0.544*  1
Index, weighted  (440,170)  (440,170) (440,170) (440,170) (440,170) (440,170) (440,170)
1 - % cognate,   0.003  0.008* -0.104* 0.160* -0.177* 0.632*  0.823*
weighted (76,330)  (76,330) (76,330) (76,330) (76,330) (67,657) (67,657)





Table 1 – Means of Genetic Distance, Geodesic Distance and Contiguity  








Overall Hostility Level = 0  
(# of observations = 513,407)  0.102 7,635 0.024
Overall Hostility Level = 2  
(# of observations = 116)  0.050 3,455 0.284
Overall Hostility Level = 3  
(# of observations = 626)  0.054 3,495 0.372
Overall Hostility Level = 4  
(# of observations = 2,092)  0.055 3,695 0.408
Overall Hostility Level = 5  
(# of observations = 1,010)  0.063 5,562 0.182
517,251 pair-year observations from 13,575 country pairs. 
* No observations involved an overall hostility level equal to 1 in the sample. 
The overall hostility level is defined by COW as the maximum of each country's hostility level within a pair. 
Hostility levels are defined in COW as follows: 0=No hostility, 1=No militarized action, 2=Threat to use force, 




Table 2 – Conditional Frequency of War (number of pair-year observations  

























  Hostility level = 5 (War) 
None 
 
277 487 178 301 44  1,010
Common sea / 
ocean = 0 
170 329 129 269 44 771
Contiguity = 0 
 
175 368 123 291 44 826
Distance > 1000 
km 
163 349 155 289 44 837
  Hostility Level > 3 (Conflict) 
None 
 
1,076 1,937 940 717 134 3,728
Common sea / 
ocean = 0 
582 1,128 569 553 114 2,364
Contiguity = 0 
 
537 1,202 520 616 119 2,457
Distance > 1000 
km 
512 1,210 780 684 134 2,808
Based on 517,251 pair-year observations from 13,575 country pairs. 
* 32 of the 44 cases in rows 3-6 involve South Africa as a combatant. 39 
 
Table 3: Baseline analysis, 1816-2000 
(dependent variable: dichotomous indicator of conflict) 
   














Fst genetic distance,   -7.4543 -1.3275 -0.9313 -0.7389  -1.4414
weighted (12.297)** (5.837)** (8.922)** (-6.224)**  (-6.511)  **
Log geodesic distance  -0.1577 -0.0735 -0.0435  -0.0531
 (4.842)** (4.487)** (-2.964)**  (-2.787)  **
Log absolute difference   -0.0120 -0.0003 -0.0089  -0.0085
in longitudes  (0.579) (0.029) (-1.189)  (-0.812)
Log absolute difference   -0.0607 -0.0250 -0.0249  -0.0284
in latitudes  (3.276)** (2.927)** (-3.909)**  (-3.166) **
1 for contiguity  0.8897 0.4227 0.1617  0.4346
 (7.713)** (7.760)** (3.675)**  (3.716)  **
Number of landlocked   -0.2088 -0.1197 -0.0875  -0.1219
countries in the pair  (6.219)** (7.553)** (-6.392)**  (-7.012) **
Number of island   0.1712 0.0551 0.0468  0.0616
countries in the pair  (4.312)** (2.969)** (3.240)**  (3.255) **
1 if pair shares at least one   0.0782 0.1029 0.0657 0.1049
sea or ocean  (1.900) (4.501)** (3.281)**  (3.264) **
Log product of land areas   0.0986 0.0511 0.0398 0.0532
in square km  (13.263)** (15.762)** (12.889)** (11.687)  **
1 if both countries are   -0.0935 -0.0816  -0.1012
democracies (polity2>5)  (8.670)** (-8.614)**  (-8.989) **
1 for pairs ever in   0.1478 0.0708  0.1541
colonial relationship  (3.413)** (2.096)*  (2.272) *
1 if countries were or are   0.0444 0.0344  0.0526
the same country  (1.021) (1.031)  (0.948)
Number of peaceful years  -0.0066 -0.0074  -0.0069
 (13.545)** (-14.131)**  (-11.182)  **
Number of other wars   0.0035 0.0025  0.0039
in year t  (16.748)** (9.447)**  (9.666) **
Dummy for alliance   -0.0593 -0.0450  -0.0537
active in year t  (4.686)** (-5.063)**  (-4.591) **
Pseudo-R2 0.047 0.208 0.300 0.309    -
Robust t statistics in parentheses  (clustering at the country pair level);  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  
All columns estimated with 517,251 observations from 13,175 country pairs. 
Probit marginal effects reported in columns (1)-(3). Logit marginal effects reported in column (4).  
For dummy variables, marginal effects are for discrete changes from 0 to 1. 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 9: Post-1950 analysis, controlling for trade variables and absolute income differences 
(dependent variable: dichotomous indicator of conflict; estimator: probit) 
     






















Fst genetic distance,   -0.5223  -0.3247 -0.3098 -0.3119 -0.3531  -0.3240
weighted  (7.181)** (5.810)** (5.485)** (4.974)** (5.386)** (4.673)**
Log geodesic distance  -0.0154  0.0047 0.0043 0.0034 0.0018  0.0032
  (2.107)* (0.721) (0.652) (0.509) (0.269) (0.477)
1 for contiguity  0.2528  0.2186 0.2134 0.2313 0.2762  0.2326
  (6.638)** (7.349)** (7.326)** (7.098)** (7.520)** (7.160)**
Log bilateral     -0.0414 -0.0395 -0.0403 -0.0360  -0.0400
openness,  t-4   (4.813)** (4.546)** (4.327)** (4.145)** (4.306)**
Log multilateral     0.0552 0.0595 0.0327 0.0158 0.0306
openness, t-4    (1.993)* (2.191)* (1.032) (0.527)  (0.962)
Log distance * log     -0.0093 -0.0098 -0.0071 -0.0048  -0.0068
mult. openness     (2.656)** (2.854)** (1.789) (1.289)  (1.700)
Log distance * log     0.0054 0.0053 0.0053 0.0047  0.0052
bilateral  openness     (5.095)** (4.883)** (4.627)** (4.398)** (4.490)**
Dummy for zero     -0.0159 -0.0159 -0.0137 -0.0127  -0.0149
trade, t-4     (2.382)* (2.431)* (1.898) (1.748)  (2.034)*
Free trade area     -0.0236 -0.0226 -0.0214  -0.0221
(full set)    (2.859)** (2.576)* (2.310)*  (2.526)*
# of GATT members     -0.0147 -0.0172 -0.0162  -0.0170
   (3.768)** (4.158)** (3.888)**  (4.134)**
Absolute difference in    1.6297 
log per capita income    (4.790)** 
Absolute difference       0.1909
in total GDP      (0.773)
# of observations  226,357  226,357 226,357 202,523 202,523  202,523
# of pairs  9,127  9,127 9,127 9,127 9,127  9,127
Pseudo-R2  0.336 0.350 0.353 0.351 0.356 0.351
Robust t statistics in parentheses (clustering at the country pair level);  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  
Probit marginal effects reported in all columns. For dummy variables, marginal effects are for discrete 
changes from 0 to 1. All marginal effects were multiplied by 100 for readability. 
Controls: In addition to reported coefficients, every column includes controls for: Log absolute difference 
in longitudes, log absolute difference in latitudes, number of landlocked countries in the pair, number of 
island countries in the pair, dummy=1 if pair shares at least one sea or ocean, log product of land areas in 
square km, dummy=1 if both countries are democracies (polity2>5), dummy=1 for pairs ever in colonial 
relationship, dummy=1 if countries were or are the same country, number of peaceful years, number of 
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